by Stephanie Lo JCHS Meyer Fellow |
Could the post-Great
Recession drop in housing demand have been driven in part by an increase in
mortgage credit spreads across borrowers? In a new Joint Center working paper
that uses proprietary data on the spread of mortgage rates across borrowers
with different credit, I find that mortgage demand does react to mortgage
interest rates in economically and statistically significant ways.
This finding is significant
because little is known about the extent to which changes in interest
rates affect the demand for mortgages. Measuring this effect is difficult because both interest rates and the
demand for mortgages are driven by macroeconomic factors. For example, after the financial crisis in
the late 2000s, interest rates fell as the Federal Reserve attempted to
stimulate the economy, but the demand for mortgages also fell because
individuals faced adverse macroeconomic conditions. A naive estimate would
suggest that over this period, lower interest rates drove lower housing demand, which is clearly not correct.
My study uses Loan Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs) to
address this issue. Instituted by FHFA in
November 2007, LLPAs are additional fees paid upfront by the lender to Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac. The fees are higher for
loans with higher loan-to-value ratios and borrowers with lower credit scores, and
feature discrete cutoffs at certain credit scores, as measured at mortgage origination.
Put simply, a borrower with a 700 credit score will face the same LLPA as a
borrower with a 701 credit score, but will benefit from a discretely lower LLPA
than a borrower with a 699 credit score.
Using administrative mortgage rate data, I find that LLPAs
are completely passed through to borrowers, so while lenders receive the same
mortgage rate across credit scores, borrowers just below a credit-score cutoff
pay a higher mortgage rate than those just above that cutoff point (Figure 1). I further show
that borrowers across these credit scores are virtually identical, and for high
credit scores, lenders do not differentially screen across these cutoffs. This
allows me to apply a regression-discontinuity design to examine how mortgage
demand changes for borrowers just above and below several credit score cutoff
points—660, 680, 700, and 720—where the interest rates offered to borrowers
change.
Notes: Rates are for conforming 30-year FRM. The numbers shown reflect the mean across the entire baseline sample for the exact FICO score shown, on the weekly level, from October 2008 to December 2014. Higher FICO scores tend to benefit from lower mortgage rates due to lower upfront payments induced by LLPAs. Source: Optimal Blue and Fannie Mae; Author’s calculations.
The results show that borrowers respond to changes in
interest rates in economically and statistically significant ways (Figure 2). I estimate
that a 25 basis point cut in interest rates results in a 50 percent increase in
the likelihood of a potential borrower to demand a loan. In a given month, this
increases the number of mortgage originations from about 100 per 100,000 individuals
to 140 per 100,000 individuals. I also find that a 25 percent basis point cut
in interest rates results in an increase in loan size of approximately $15,000,
or about 10 percent of the average origination volume.
Notes: The mortgage rate series comes from the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Rates survey. Mortgage originations data is calculated as the total recorded origination amount for purchase mortgages by year, using the proprietary McDash LLC data.
These estimates help to explain the post-crisis drop in
mortgage demand from low-income and low-credit borrowers. A
back-of-the-envelope calculation using my estimates suggests that, had 680-719
FICO borrowers been subject to the same LLPA as 720 FICO borrowers, this group
would have generated $15 billion more in mortgage demand over six years, which
would have been a 33 percent increase in mortgage lending to this group alone. More
generally, my estimates suggest that borrowers were very sensitive to mortgage
rates after the crisis, implying that the Federal Reserve’s efforts to lower
interest rates, which in turn lowered mortgage rates, may have been very
effective in bolstering the housing market.
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