by George Masnick Fellow |
The
U.S. fertility rate is at near replacement level, where a woman bears two
children over her lifetime (just enough to ‘replace’ herself and her
partner). The Total Fertility Rate
(TFR), which is how many children the average woman in the U.S. will have if
she survives through the reproductive ages and bears children at each age at
rates U.S. women are currently experiencing, is just below this level. Replacement fertility leads to a “pillar”
like age structure, where the base of the pillar (children) contains about the
same number of people per five-year age group as the middle of the pillar (parents). For the U.S., that number is currently about
20 million (Exhibit 1).
This
situation can be contrasted with fertility rates and age structures in most
other industrialized countries.
Below-replacement fertility in much of Europe and in a number of Asian
countries has created “mushroom cloud” shaped age structures where the numbers
of children are just fractions of the size of the parents’ generations. In Germany, for example, the 0-4 and 5-9 age
groups are only about half the size of the 40-44 and 45-49 age groups (Exhibit
1). Age structures for other countries
with TFRs of 1.6 or less are broadly similar to Germany’s (Table 1). Such an imbalance in age structures has the
potential to create enormous problems for these societies in areas such as
institutional stability (e.g. schools), labor force succession, housing market
dynamics, and old-age social security.
Shrinking class sizes, workforce shortages, declining demand for larger
homes that prevent older households from downsizing, and payroll tax
collections that are insufficient to pay for retirement benefits are all
consequences of long periods of below-replacement fertility.
So
why is the U.S. such an outlier compared to other industrialized countries in
having experienced recent near replacement-level fertility and a relatively healthy
age structure? And, is the U.S. likely
to retain this advantage in the future?
The answers to these questions point to the importance of immigration in
shaping the present demography of the U.S., and to uncertainty about future
levels of immigration and the role it will play in the future.
Decomposing
the U.S. age structure into immigrants (first generation), the children of
immigrants born in the U.S. (second generation), and third or higher
generations (parents born in the U.S.), illustrates the importance of
immigration in both backfilling the smaller baby bust cohorts born between the
mid-1960s and mid-1980s and in increasing the cohort size of children born here
in the past 20 years (Exhibit 2).
According to a recent Pew Research Center report, immigrant fertility rates are about 50 percent
higher than native-born rates. While
in 2010, only 17 percent of women of reproductive age were immigrants,
immigrant women bore a quarter of all children born in the 2000s. Replacement
level fertility in the 2000s was achieved by above-replacement immigrant
fertility counter balancing below-replacement native fertility.
The
future stability of the age structure of the U.S. will depend on levels of
immigration and on fertility trends of both the native born and of
immigrants. The Pew report cited above
documents how dramatically fertility rates have fallen since the Great Recession,
with the largest percentage declines occurring among immigrants. Between 2007 and 2010 the number of births
per 1,000 women age 15-44 (the General Fertility Rate) fell for native-born
women by 6 percent while for foreign-born women the decline was 14 percent.
Whether fertility declines have been mostly driven by high unemployment and low
wages and so will rebound with an improving economy is too soon to tell. Any rebound could still leave fertility
levels below the replacement rate. But
in any case, it is unlikely that U.S. women will soon adopt the very low levels
of childbearing that characterize much of the developed world. The influence on fertility of “pro-family” fundamentalist religions in the U.S. and the not-unrelated political hostility to birth
control and abortion in many parts of the country continue to support higher
levels of U.S. childbearing.
However,
the size and composition of future streams of immigration are very much in
question. Immigration reform has been
slow to gain traction in the U.S. Congress, and the outcome of any new
legislation on future immigration levels remains uncertain. More to the point, perhaps, is the fact that
several important sending countries are undergoing fundamental transformations
in both their economies and demographics that will diminish their propensities
to send immigrants. For example, Mexico
accounts for about 30 percent of all foreign-born living in the U.S., and immigration
from Mexico has long been a safety valve to release excess population growth in
that country. But Mexico has reduced its
fertility by over one-half since 1985, with much of the reduction occurring in
the past decade. In the future, as long
as Mexico’s economy continues to prosper, we can expect fewer will need to
leave Mexico to find work. Similar
transformations are occurring in other sending countries such as India and
China. Age structures in these countries have begun to transform from “pyramid”
to “pillar” shapes.
Before closing, I want to say a few words about one industrialized country, Sweden, which has succeeded in maintaining near replacement fertility without depending on high fertility immigrants. There are indeed immigrants to Sweden who are needed to fill certain jobs, but they mostly come from other low fertility countries in Europe, especially the Balkans, and the immigrants retain the low fertility of their countries of origin. Sweden has a long history of low native-born fertility going back to the 1970s, and has gradually adopted strong social policies to encourage its citizens to voluntarily become parents, including generous maternity/paternity leaves, significant health care and housing benefits, and low-cost, high quality, and readily available daycare. But even with such strong pro-natalist policies, Sweden can barely keep its fertility at near-replacement levels.
We
should be thankful that our recent history of high-fertility immigration has
helped create an age structure that will lead to far fewer problems in the near
future compared to those facing other industrialized countries. Whether we continue to retain this advantage
will depend on future levels of both immigration and fertility (of both the
native-born and the newly arrived). To
avoid the U.S. moving toward a mushroom cloud like age structure, absent
widespread pro-natalist programs and policies as in the case of Sweden, the
depressed immigration levels and declining fertility trends of recent years
will need to be reversed.