Showing posts with label freddie mac. Show all posts
Showing posts with label freddie mac. Show all posts

Thursday, July 31, 2014

With More than 2 Million Units at Risk, How Can the U.S. Preserve its Affordable Rental Housing Stock?

by Irene Lew
Research Assistant
As our most recent State of the Nation’s Housing report confirms, the renter affordability crisis shows no signs of abating, with more than one in four renters spending over 50 percent of their income on housing in 2012. With the Great Recession pushing up the number of very low-income households that qualified for rental assistance by 3.3 million between 2007 and 2011 (a 21 percent increase), the number of available subsidized rental units has not kept pace—the share of eligible households able to secure aid dropped from 27 percent to 24 percent over this period.

Given the growing demand for subsidized rental housing, preserving the existing stock of affordable housing has become critical. In our report, we analyzed data from the National Housing Preservation Database to determine what types of federally subsidized units with assistance tied to them are particularly vulnerable to loss over the next decade, due to expiring contract or affordable-use restrictions. (The other two primary forms of assisted housing are public housing developments and units rented in the private market using Housing Choice Vouchers.)

Using the database, we determined that contracts or affordable-use restrictions for more than 2 million federally assisted rental units will expire between 2014 and 2024. This amounts to 43 percent of federally subsidized units. Rental units subsidized through two programs—the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program and HUD-funded project-based rental assistance—represent 85 percent of housing with expiring contracts or affordability restrictions (see Figure 33). Project-based rental assistance includes Project-based Section 8, as well as Project Rental Assistance Contracts (PRACs) that provide rental assistance to low-income older adults and those with disabilities. 


Over half (57 percent) of the units with expiring restrictions in the coming decade are subsidized through the LIHTC program, while those with project-based rental assistance account for 28 percent. Units in properties supported by HOME funding and those subsidized with USDA Section 515 Rural Rental Housing Loans represent 9 percent, while another four percent are in properties with FHA mortgage insurance, and the remaining 3 percent are subsidized through older HUD programs.

Units in properties subsidized with project-based rental assistance are vulnerable to being removed from the affordable stock because these programs are subject to annual Congressional appropriations, which have continued to decline. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s recent approval of the Fiscal Year 2015 Transportation-HUD Appropriations Bill included a $200 million reduction in project-based rental assistance from the Fiscal Year 2014 enacted level. These budget cutbacks come on the heels of sequestration, which reduced the amount of available funding for project-based rental assistance contracts and forced HUD to short-fund thousands of contracts in 2013 to prevent them from expiring. Short-funding refers to the practice of partially funding renewals in the form of yearly contracts, thereby deferring ongoing costs to future fiscal year budgets in order achieve cost savings today. However, this practice creates uncertainty for owners by adding more complexity to ongoing property financing and operations.

With short-funding becoming so common for the project-based assistance program, over half of the 596,000 units with contracts expiring over the next decade will come up for renewal in 2014 and 2015 alone.  As federal funding becomes more uncertain and HUD struggles to fund existing project-based contracts, fewer owners who are eligible for contract renewals may decide that it is feasible to continue to rent to low-income households, increasing the likelihood that these properties may leave the affordable rental housing stock. And should budget shortfalls continue, HUD may have no choice but to allow some project-based rental assistance contracts to expire even if the owners want to remain in the program.

Meanwhile, units in properties subsidized through the LIHTC program are less vulnerable to removal from the affordable stock, although they represent the lion’s share of units with affordability periods expiring over the next decade. Between 2014 and 2024, approximately 1.2 million LIHTC units will reach the end of their 15- or 30-year mandatory affordability period and are eligible to leave the program. Owners of these properties have three options: apply for another round of tax credits, maintain the property as affordable housing without new subsidies, or convert the property to market-rate housing. For the most part, according to a 2012 HUD report, LIHTC properties that reached the end of their required 15-year affordability period continue to operate as affordable housing without new subsidies. These properties remain affordable without new subsidies for several reasons: they obtain a nonprofit sponsor with a long-term commitment to continuing affordability, they have project-based subsidies such as Section 8 that the owner does not want to give up, and/or the LIHTC rents vary little from market rents. Properties at higher risk for conversion to market-rate housing tend to be owned by for-profit owners in high-cost markets.  While the LIHTC program is not subject to annual appropriations, it could be endangered by comprehensive tax reform that would take a close look at these types of tax expenditures. But given the importance of the LIHTC program in both new production and preservation of affordable rental housing, it does have broad political support.

Given the gap between the demand for rental assistance and the number of assisted units available, there is a clear need for greater efforts to both preserve and expand affordable rental housing developments. Preservation initiatives such as HUD’s Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) help ensure that approximately 16,100 rental units in privately-owned properties subsidized through older project-based assistance programs (Rent Supplement and Rental Assistance Payment) remain affordable even after their nonrenewable contracts expire. Yet, RAD only addresses a small part of the growing need for preserving such housing.

Meanwhile, promising large-scale initiatives such as the National Housing Trust Fund have stalled due to lack of funding. Signed into law in 2008 as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, the fund is a permanent program not subject to annual appropriations and has the potential to preserve a substantial share of federally assisted rental housing while also adding new affordable units. The fund was also the first new production program targeted to households with extremely low incomes since the creation of the Section 8 program in 1974. Unfortunately, the program remains unfunded to this day. Initially, it was to be financed with contributions from the GSEs, but these contributions were suspended indefinitely once Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by FHFA in 2008. Most proposals for GSE reform, including the Johnson-Crapo bill making its way through the Senate, include some provision to fund affordable housing, but it remains unclear when Congressional action will occur, and what form, if any, the final legislation will provide for affordable rental housing.    

Thursday, May 30, 2013

Despite Rising Home Prices, Homeownership More Affordable than Ever

by Rocio Sanchez-Moyano
Research Assistant
For those able to obtain loans in today’s constrained credit environment, the monthly cost of homeownership is at historic lows, thanks to low interest rates.  Though the National Association of Realtors’ median single family home price increased by 6 percent in 2012, falling interest rates have made mortgage payments cheaper: assuming a 20 percent down payment and 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, monthly payments on a median priced home in 2012 were $644. Compared to median incomes, payments are lower than they have been in more than two decades.

Sources: JCHS tabulations of Freddie Mac, Primary Mortgage Market Survey; National Association of Realtors;  US Census Bureau, Moody’s Analytics Estimates.

The record low interest rates available in 2012 helped reduce monthly mortgage payments in 82.9 percent of metros from 2011 to 2012; payments also declined in 80.3 percent of metros that experienced price gains.  Even in metros with substantial price appreciation, such as Phoenix (24.6 percent) and San Francisco (11.9 percent), growth in mortgage payments was muted, rising 13.3 and 1.7 percent, respectively.  In fact, interest rate declines over the last year were enough to offset price increases of up to 10 percent price appreciation.

The current interest rate environment would keep payment-to-income ratios affordable for median buyers in a majority of cities even under much larger price increases.  Following the methodology used by the National Association of Realtors (NAR) in calculating their housing affordability index, a mortgage payment is considered affordable if it represents no more than 25 percent of monthly income.  Using this as a threshold, mortgage payments on a median priced home were affordable in more than 95 percent of metros in 2012.  Even if house prices were to rise by 20 percent, without a change in interest rates, 91.5 percent of metros would remain affordable to the median buyer.  In fact, the cost of a nationally median-priced home would have to increase by more than 72.1 percent to become unaffordable at the median household income.  Interest rates are so far below their historical average that few metros would become unaffordable to the median buyer even with moderate changes in interest rate.  For example, if interest rates increased to 5 percent, comparable to rates in 2009, only 2 percent more metros would become unaffordable to the median buyer.

Though mortgage payments are at historic lows, purchasing a home is still unaffordable for many prospective buyers.  In some traditionally expensive markets, such as the large California metros and Honolulu, monthly mortgage payments were already too costly for the median homebuyer in 2012.  For first time homebuyers, whose payments are approximated using a 10 percent down payment on a home priced at 85 percent of the median, and incomes of 65 percent of the median, 17.1 percent of metros were unaffordable.  The effect is more pronounced in the largest 20 metros, as 35 percent of them are unaffordable to first time buyers. (Click table to enlarge.)


Notes:  Payments and payment-to-income ratios for the median homebuyer assume a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage with 20 percent down payment on a median priced home and median income for the metro; for a first time homebuyer, payments and payment-to-income ratios assume a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage with a 10 percent down payment on a home priced at 85 percent of the median and an income of 65 percent of the median, as per the NAR first time homebuyer affordability index. Sources: JCHS tabulations of Freddie Mac, Primary Mortgage Market Survey; National Association of Realtors; US Census Bureau, Moody’s Analytics Estimates.

While it is likely that homeownership will remain affordable in the short term, these historic levels of affordability may not last.  Prices increased in 86.6 percent of metros from 2011-12 and interest rates were slightly higher in the first months of 2012 than at the end of 2012, according to the Primary Mortgage Market Survey issued by Freddie Mac.  Buyers who were waiting for the best deal as prices and interest rates continued to drop before entering the market may be spurred by current trends to think that this may be the ideal time to buy.

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

Foreclosures: The Great Untold Story

by Chris Arnold
Guest Blogger
From time to time, Housing Perspectives features posts by guest bloggers. Today's post, written by NPR Housing and Economics Correspondent Chris Arnold, reflects thoughts from a panel he moderated at the Harvard Kennedy School on March 26, 2013. The panel was entitled "Foreclosures: The Great Untold Story" and included panelists Mike Calhoun (Center for Responsible Lending), Gary Klein (Klein Kavanagh Costello, LLP), and Bruce Marks (Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America)


People know there’s a foreclosure crisis.  Yes, the housing market crashed and lots of people are losing their homes.  But most people don’t realize that about half of foreclosures don’t need to happen. 


That is, about half the time, when a homeowner falls behind on their mortgage payments, there is a better alternative that will keep the homeowner in their house and result in a smaller loss for the lender (often investors in RMBS).  

When president Obama came into office, in the spring of 2009, he started the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP.)  The goal was to prevent 4 million foreclosures by modifying the terms of people’s mortgages in cases where lowering a borrowers interest rate, and perhaps forgiving some principal, would be “NPV Positive” for the lenders.  In other words, the goal was to modify loans in cases where it made better business sense for the lender to keep people in their homes instead of foreclosing.  This also helps the housing market and the broader economy by reducing the overall numbers of foreclosures and the losses associated with them.

The problem is, while many economists thought that 4 million people estimate was a pretty good one, 4 years later the program has only reached about 1 million people.  There have also been 3.4 million non-HAMP mods over this period but data on the quality of these mods remains murky.

Meanwhile, according to recent data compiled by the JCHS (State of the Nation's Housing, 2012, Figure 20) there are still roughly 3 million seriously delinquent loans in (or heading into) the foreclosure pipeline.  

The JCHS recently hosted a panel of people working on the front lines to prevent foreclosures.  All are strong advocates for increasing the number of loan modifications in order to help housing markets.  They said there are still serious problems implementing the HAMP program, and that if some changes were made, there is still time to prevent tens, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of unnecessary foreclosures.  



The Panelists were (pictured above, right to left):
  • Gary Klein, Partner, Klein Kavanagh Costello, LLP 
  • Mike Calhoun, President, Center for Responsible Lending
  • Bruce Marks, CEO, NACA (Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America)

I hosted the panel, and these are the highlights of the recommendations from the group.  

Gary Klein has been suing the nation's largest banks for their alleged failure to provide loan modifications for people who should qualify for HAMP.  Often, he said, the major banks that “service” the mortgages on behalf of investors (the banks are responsible for qualifying homeowners for HAMP) drag out the process for far too long.  Homeowners can stay stuck in limbo trying to qualify for the program for 6 months, 9 months, sometimes for more than a year.  Klein says the HAMP agreement/contract documents signed by the banks and the homeowners state that the bank has 3 months to make a decision.  This agreement is struck when a homeowner begins the “trial period” of the HAMP program and starts making lower monthly payments.  Klein recommended that if a homeowner stays current, making payments, for those 3 months, and the bank has yet to make a decision, the homeowner should be automatically qualified for HAMP and receive a permanent loan modification through the program.  Currently there are more than 59,000 active HAMP trial mods according to the Treasury Department.  So Klein would like to see many of those automatically converted to permanent loan mods.  

Mike Calhoun has been studying the foreclosure crisis for years now at the Center For Responsible Lending.  He urged the regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the FHFA) to allow for loan modifications involving principal write-downs.  Loans not backed by Fannie and Freddie have been receiving principal write-downs more frequently as private investors calculate that it can make good business sense to avoid a foreclosure this way.  Calhoun urged Fannie and Freddie to follow suit.  

Calhoun also suggested expanding the administration’s HARP II refinancing program.  He’d like HARP II to permit delinquent borrowers (who are currently not eligible) to refinance into today’s low market interest rates.  In many cases, Calhoun said, just cutting a homeowner’s interest rate to what is currently available on the market can be enough to prevent a foreclosure. 

Bruce Marks’s organization NACA has been functioning essentially as an outsourced loan modification “qualifier” for all of the nation’s largest banks/ loan servicers.  Marks said NACA has enabled more than 200,000 homeowners to avoid foreclosure with a loan mod.  Like Calhoun, Marks would like to see more principal write-downs to avoid foreclosures.  Marks also said he wished that bankruptcy judges had been allowed to help rewrite the terms of mortgages (this was proposed by federal lawmakers in recent years but couldn’t get approval in Congress). 

One hopeful sign, Mike Calhoun said, is that the quality of the loan modifications done by loan servicers outside of the HAMP program appears to be improving.  But the panelists said the exact terms of many of those modifications remain unclear.  

Wednesday, January 16, 2013

Completing the Housing Market Reform Agenda

by William Apgar
Senior Scholar
End of year festivities and Congressional budget deliberations in 2012 unfortunately diverted attention away from the critical task of ensuring that all Americans have access to decent and affordable housing in the year ahead.  The Joint Center’s recently-released report, Getting on the Right Track: Improving Low-Income and Minority Access to Mortgage Credit after the Housing Bust, discusses what policies and programs will be needed to promote fair, affordable, and sustainable homeownership opportunities for these market segments. At the most basic level, mortgage markets rest on the ability of individual borrowers to repay their loans. Current efforts of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) have set in motion a comprehensive reform of loan origination and loan servicing, including definitions as to what constitutes a good loan product with the ability to repay.  

Meanwhile, left undecided are the fates of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs) as well as the future of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the broader government role in meeting mortgage credit needs of historically underserved borrowers and communities. These elements are perhaps even more contentious than the rules and regulations now being implemented by the CFPB, but it is important to complete the task of rebuilding the new mortgage finance system to ensure that the near catastrophic events of the past five are not repeated.  Getting on the Right Track makes several recommendations to this end, including the following:

FHA must be retooled to meet its historic role as lender of last resort.  
FHA has emerged as a vital lending source to lower-income households and households with less than pristine credit records and limited ability to accumulate the downpayment needed to purchase a home.  To be more effective in its role as lender of last resort, FHA needs to be retooled to be more than a first responder in a financial market emergency. As such, it should have the flexibility and capacity to experiment with mortgage features and adjust pricing as conditions warrant. In particular, FHA must be freed from those congressionally-imposed restrictions that limit its ability to rebuild its financial capacity to be able respond to any future mortgage market turmoil. 

Deciding on the future of the GSEs is the most complex of the remaining items on the reform agenda.  GSE reform is of course intricately entwined with current rulemaking about a borrower’s ability to repay and what constitutes a good mortgage product.   There is little doubt that without a government-backed secondary market, private capital would not be widely available in difficult-to-serve markets. It is also questionable whether, in a world with more limited government guarantees, the private sector would even serve the broader market for longer-term fixed-rate mortgage products.  Various proposals suggest that rather than eliminate government support for the secondary market entirely, a reformed set of secondary market entities should maintain a minimal presence in the market during normal times, but should be ready to scale up when private capital withdraws in times of financial stress.  Such an effort would present the operational challenge of designing and pricing a steady flow of guarantees in normal times, yet maintaining capacity to take on business quickly in stressful times.

Completing the reform agenda is important.  It took years to create today’s housing finance –system—both the good components and the bad. Completing the reform agenda, including reform of FHA and the GSEs, will take time, but it is important to push forward and complete the job in order to place the newly emerging mortgage finance system on solid footing and to ensure continued access to housing opportunities for low-wealth and low-income people and communities.