How HOPE Creates Opportunity in Rural Areas

by Alan Branson
COO, HOPE
&
Jeremy Avins
MPA/MBA candidate,
HKS/Stanford

The papers from the third panel of the Joint Center’s symposium on A Shared Future: Fostering Communities of Inclusion in an Era of Inequality focus on policies that might increase access to opportunities in three major metropolitan areas (Chicago, Houston, and Washington, D.C.). But in many rural areas, as well as many non-major metros, the challenge is often less about developing policies to create equitable access to the opportunity that exists than it is about creating opportunity in the first place—and then ensuring more people can afford to access it.

We believe the experiences of HOPE, a family of development organizations dedicated to strengthening communities, building assets, and improving lives in economically distressed parts of Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, show how a capital access strategy can help people in non-major metro and rural markets where, compared to high-growth markets, zoning and land-use policy tend to be less comprehensive, homeownership is more common, and gentrification is less of a concern. Even in rural markets where integration is difficult due to the physical isolation that has developed for many communities of color, homeownership strategies facilitated by access to affordable capital can help households acquire other benefits associated with homeownership, including the possibility that individuals will invest in “places” as way to create communities of opportunity.

Comprised of a regional credit union (Hope Credit Union), a loan fund (Hope Enterprise Corporation), and a policy center (Hope Policy Institute), HOPE has provided financial services, leveraged private and public resources, and shaped policies that have benefited more than a million residents in one of the nation’s most persistently poor regions. Much of HOPE’s work has focused on increasing access to homeownership, which has long been viewed as a key means of increasing wealth accumulation. In particular, HOPE provides a manually underwritten, high-LTV affordable mortgage product. The product allows HOPE to serve borrowers who have been underserved by conventional lenders such as minorities, women, and/or first-time homeowners (Figure 1).

Figure 1: HOPE Borrower Characteristics

Source: HOPE analysis of HOPE Mortgage Lending Portfolio for January 2011-June 2017; National Association of Realtors®, "First-time Homebuyers: Slightly Up at 32 Percent of Residential Sales in 2016."

HOPE’s experiences also shed light on efforts to increase access to “opportunity communities” – places with more resources, less crime, better-quality schools, etc. Recent research by Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren suggests that growing up in such places “has significant causal effects” on a child’s “prospects for upward mobility.” In fact, since 2011, more than 50 percent of HOPE’s borrowers bought a house in a census tract other than the one in which they had previously been renting. Moreover, those tracts generally had higher household incomes, higher median home values, higher average educational attainment, and better schools than the tracts the buyers were leaving. Interestingly, while the “movers” tended to be younger and black (compared to borrowers who did not move from their census tract), there were few differences in the incomes or home values between the two groups (Figure 2).

Figure 2: HOPE Borrower and Community Characteristics
Related to Borrower Relocation

Source: HOPE analysis of HOPE Mortgage Lending Portfolio for January 2011-June 2017

Moreover, the focus on moving to opportunity areas should not obscure the significance of the many borrowers who stayed in the same census tract. Research suggests that homeownership is predictive of increased community participation and other positive social outcomes, a finding that is consistent with our experiences among borrowers who did not move to another census tract.

In addition, the large number of people making commitments to their existing communities reminds us that, as Chetty and Hendren note, efforts to increase opportunity should focus both on giving people a chance to move to opportunity and to finding “methods of improving neighborhood environments in areas that currently generate low levels of mobility.” This view is echoed and amplified by Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner who, as noted in Bill Fulton’s paper, has “argued forcefully that children in underserved neighborhoods should not have to move to high-opportunity areas in order to find a path to success in life.”

HOPE’s experience is that investing in people and investing in place are both necessary, and each is insufficient on its own. Moreover, HOPE’s efforts underscore the importance of creating and ensuring access to opportunities in rural and non-major metro areas that currently lack them. Creating these opportunities requires broader access to capital at least as much as it requires thoughtful land-use policies, and it requires meeting people where they are as much as it requires helping them move.

How Housing Counseling Creates More Neighborhood Choice for Buyers

by Marietta Rodriguez
NeighborWorks

The US housing system simultaneously is one of the most efficient markets in the world and one of the most complex.

While the efficiency offers consumers many opportunities, the complexity makes it more likely that consumers will make housing and mortgage choices that are not in their best interests. However, our experience at NeighborWorks® shows that housing counseling programs can greatly increase buyers' ability to find and finance homes that are right for them.

With transparent pricing, multiple participants, and regulations that help ensure its stability and strength, the US housing system has many of the attributes of an efficient market. Moreover, as the papers in this panel describe, new technologies are making it even easier to access information about both homes for sale and ways of financing the purchases of those dwellings.

However, many consumers find the home buying process to be daunting. Illustratively, a recent household survey conducted for NeighborWorks® America found 74 percent of Americans (and more than 80 percent of millennials) think that the home buying process is complicated. The survey also found that while the overwhelming share of Americans (including millennials) consider homeownership a key component of the American dream—especially people of color and millennials—thousands of would-be buyers are shut out of the market because of confusion about down payment requirements, lack of information about credit standards, and the burden of student loan debt. Moreover, the complexity of the housing system creates the possibility that consumers who are in the market may make housing and mortgage choices that are not in their best interests, including limiting their home choices without looking at all of the available options and selecting mortgage products that are unsuitable or too expensive.

Part of the problem may be that when seeking information on buying a home, Americans are most likely to consult a real estate agent, search the web, or talk with friends or family who are homeowners. In contrast, only about 40 percent of adults (and half of millennials) are likely to seek counsel from a non-profit organization, such as the many NeighborWorks® member organizations that provide advice on buying a home (and only a fifth said they were very likely to do so).

This is unfortunate because our experience at NeighborWorks® strongly suggests that working with certified housing counselors (at a NeighborWorks® Homeownership Center or other HUD-approved housing counseling agencies) can help consumers make good choices about whether and what to buy, how to finance those purchases, and how to maintain their new homes. Housing counselors do so by working one-on-one with potential homebuyers, helping them develop a budget and to strengthen their credit so they can maximize their chance of getting the lowest possible mortgage rate. Moreover, because they are tightly connected to the communities they serve, housing counselors are aware of  trends practically on a block-by-block basis, knowledge that can help a homebuyer sift through the mountains of data on everything from traffic patterns, crime statistics, and school ratings to which community is closest to the best green space and other amenities.

Housing counselors also can help consumers gain access to a myriad of down payment assistance programs and mortgage products that can make it possible to either spend less than they had planned on mortgage payments or to purchase higher priced homes in more desirable communities. The down payment assistance programs, for example, can not only reduce the time and amount of cash consumers must save on their own to buy a home, they can also reduce the amount they need to borrow, which can lover monthly mortgage payments. Knowing about these programs may be especially important for non-White consumers. According to the 2017 NeighborWorks® America Housing Survey, the average African-American and Hispanic consumer assumed that the minimum down payment generally was a little more than 20 percent, an amount substantially higher than the typical down payment made by first-time homebuyers or the 3.5 percent down payment requirement for an FHA loan.

Moreover, because the role of a housing counselor is to help a homebuyer make the right choice for themselves, a housing counselor is not limited to a small set of mortgage choices the way a mortgage officer at a particular lender would be. For example, the largest mortgage lenders originate very few loan products that are offered by state housing finance agencies (HFAs). These HFA mortgages often have strong, but more flexible underwriting criteria that can help overcome mortgage denial issues that may happen with standard mortgage products and underwriting policies.

Combined, all this assistance can help ensure that homebuyers are more likely to choose affordable homes and mortgages, according to a 2013 study done for NeighborWorks® by Neil Mayer and Associates. The study, which looked at 75,000 homeowners who received housing counseling from NeighborWorks® organizations, found that compared to similar homeowners who did not receive counseling, homeowners who received counseling were one-third less likely to fall seriously behind on their mortgages. Such data, and other findings from the study, confirm that housing counseling allows consumers—particularly low and moderate-income and minority consumers—to access and remain in affordable homes in a wider and more diverse array of neighborhoods and communities.

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Papers from the A Shared Future symposium are available on the JCHS website. 

Taking it to the House: Our Most Popular Blogs of 2017

by David Luberoff, Deputy Director

As we turn the calendar to 2018, we took a moment to look back at the past year to see what were the most popular articles in our Housing Perspectives blog.  

The top five articles of 2017 were:

1. When Do Renters Behave Like Homeowners?
   In high-housing cost cities, renters and homeowners both oppose new residential developments proposed for their neighborhoods. (Written by Michael Hankinson, a Joint Center Meyer Doctoral Fellow)


2. Wait... What? Ten Surprising Findings from the 2017 State of the Nation’s Housing Report
   There were a number of surprises in our annual report, including the fact that fewer homes were built over the last 10 years than any 10-year period in recent history and that the homeownership gap between whites and African-Americans widened to its largest disparity since WWII. (Written by Daniel McCue, a Senior Research Associate at the Joint Center)


3. Are Home Prices Really Above Their Pre-Recession Peak?
   While nominal home prices were above their mid-2000s heights in 48 percent of the nation’s 951 local markets, in real dollars, prices reached their peaks in only 15 percent of those markets. (Written by Alexander Hermann, a Research Assistant at the Joint Center)


4. Projection: US Will Add 25 Million Households by 2035
   Revising previous estimates, the Joint Center now predicts that the United States will add 13.6 million households between 2015 and 2025, and another 11.5 million households between 2025 and 2035. (Also written by Daniel McCue)


5. Our Disappearing Supply of Low-Cost Rental Housing
   The number of units renting for $2,000 or more per month (in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars) nearly doubled between 2005 and 2015, while the number of units renting for below $800 fell by 2 percent. (Written by Elizabeth La Jeunesse, a Joint Center Research Analyst)

Rebuilding from 2017's Natural Disasters: When, For What, and How Much?

by Kermit Baker and
Alexander Hermann

The bulk of repairs to homes damaged by this year's record-setting disasters will not be done until 2019 or 2020, according to our analysis of post-disaster spending between 1994 and 2015. The analysis, which looked at the estimated annual cost of natural disasters alongside annual estimates of disaster-related home repairs and improvements, suggests that an increase of $10 billion in total disaster losses any time in the previous three years is associated with about $300 million in additional annual spending on disaster-related home repairs and improvements.

Notes: Dollar values are adjusted for inflation using the CPI-U for all items. Natural disaster costs include only natural disasters that generate over $1 billion in damages after adjusting for inflation.
Sources: JCHS tabulation of US Housing and Urban Development, American Housing Survey, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration data.

The finding is significant because 2017 was an unusually destructive year. While inflation-adjusted, disaster-related damages averaged about $40 billion a year between 1994 and 2015, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria together caused about $150 billion in damages, according to estimates from CoreLogic and Moody’s Analytics (Figure 1). Moreover, damages from 2017’s winter storms, droughts, and wildfires will push these numbers even higher. In fact, the total cost of 2017’s disasters could exceed damages from any year in the last two decades, including 2005, the previous record year, when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (and a host of smaller but significant disasters) combined to cause more than $200 billion in damages (in inflation-adjusted dollars).

As in other years that were marked by particularly destructive storms and other disasters, this year’s damages should lead to a spurt in construction activity. Some of it will be construction of and renovations to infrastructure and commercial buildings. Some will be the construction of new single-family homes and multifamily housing units. And some will be disaster-related repairs and improvements to both owner-occupied and rental housing.

Extensive flooding from Hurricane Harvey in Port Arthur, Texas.

To estimate how much will be spent on post-disaster home repairs, and when that spending is likely to occur, we combined information on disaster-related damages reported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) with data on disaster-related home repairs and improvements for the same years found in the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Housing Survey (AHS). The AHS, as a survey of households, only asks owners to report spending on their homes. The comparison suggests that renovation spending continues to increase for about two to three years after the natural disaster occurs, and that an increase of $10 billion in disaster losses any time over the prior three years generates about $300 million in additional disaster-related home improvement spending during the year studied. If this pattern holds, the bulk of the spending from 2017 losses won’t occur until 2019 or 2020. But when it occurs, there is likely to be a substantial increase in spending on home renovations in those years.

While the delay between disaster losses and repair expenditures may seem unusually lengthy, it is consistent with a study funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that examined the rebuilding that took place following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In a recent Joint Center blog on that study’s implications, our colleague Jonathan Spader (who worked on the initial HUD study) reported that only 70 percent of hurricane-damaged properties in Louisiana and Mississippi had been rebuilt by early 2010, five years after the storms. The study further found that 74 percent of owner-occupied homes had been rebuilt, compared to only 60 percent of the rental properties.

The delays are due to many factors. Insurance companies need to assess the extent of the damage and determine how much is covered. Home improvement contractors, stretched to the limit and suffering from a labor squeeze, must delay certain projects. Owners have to consider local housing and labor market conditions to determine if repairs or improvements make financial sense. Often, federal, state, and local government entities may slow down rebuilding while they decide whether it’s feasible and, if so, whether building codes and insurance guidelines should be more stringent.

Nevertheless, spending will occur and, when it does, it can be substantial. Illustratively, in 2015 (which came after a few relatively mild years for disasters) spending on disaster-related home renovations accounted for almost $11 billion of the $220 billion spent nationally improving owner-occupied homes according to the 2015 AHS. (Lightning and fires accounted for $2.4 billion of this spending, floods for $2.0 billion, and tornados and hurricanes for $1.6 billion. Winter storms, thunderstorms, earthquakes, and drought accounted for the remainder.)

In short, 2017’s hurricanes and other disasters are likely to result in substantial spending on rebuilding, repairs, and improvements to disaster-damaged homes. Moreover, while that spending will ramp up slowly, it is likely to stretch into next decade.

Rebuilding Housing in Harvey’s Aftermath: Two Lessons from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

by Jonathan Spader
Senior Research Associate

As floodwaters finally subside in Houston, and as Florida residents prepare for Irma, residents, civic leaders, and policymakers can glean two important lessons from the intensive efforts to rebuild homes and communities after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, two devastating storms that hit the U.S. in back-to-back succession in 2005. 

First, rebuilding residential properties is a lengthy process likely to take several years. Second, the rebuilding process will be especially lengthy for rental properties (as compared to owner-occupied homes), which could greatly affect the 950,000 renters (who account for 41 percent of households) in the greater Houston metropolitan area, as well as additional renters affected by Hurricane Harvey in elsewhere in Texas and in other states. The slower pace of rental rebuilding is due to several factors including both renters’ dependence on property owners to rebuild rental housing units and historical differences in the availability and terms of federal aid for rental property owners as compared to homeowners.

To be sure, the need for emergency assistance and shelter for displaced residents will continue for weeks to come. Nevertheless, Congress is already starting to discuss an aid package. Moreover, the extensive damage (and the need to reauthorize the National Flood Insurance Program before September 30) may spur new efforts to develop policies and programs to support housing recovery in the wake of future natural disasters. As policymakers, civic leaders, and local residents begin to focus on the rebuilding process, they might want to keep the following in mind.

Extensive flooding from Hurricane Harvey in Southeast Texas. Air National Guard photo by Staff Sgt. Daniel J. Martinez

1. Rebuilding residential properties takes time.

An initial lesson from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is that the rebuilding process takes time, with many properties continuing to show observable damage several years after the storms had passed. In early 2010—almost five years after both hurricanes made landfall—a HUD-commissioned study that I worked on surveyed the exterior conditions of properties damaged by those storms. The survey produced representative estimates of the rebuilding outcomes of properties that experienced “major” or “severe” damage—defined by FEMA as $5,200 or more in storm-related damage—that were located on significantly-affected blocks—defined as a city block on which three or more properties experienced “major” or “severe” damage.

The survey found that 17 percent of hurricane-damaged properties in Louisiana and Mississippi still showed substantial repair needs as of early 2010, almost five years after the storms had hit. Almost half these properties did not meet the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of a “habitable structure,” a housing unit that is closed to the elements with an intact roof, windows, and doors and does not show any positive evidence (e.g. a sign on the house) stating that the unit was condemned or was going to be demolished. Only 70 percent of hurricane-damaged properties in Louisiana and Mississippi were rebuilt by early 2010, and 13 percent contained cleared lots in which the damaged property had been removed from the parcel (Figure 1).

In the case of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the properties that still were damaged included some whose owners had received rebuilding grants through federal programs designed to aid housing recovery. The largest source of assistance following the 2005 hurricanes was the $18.9 billion special Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) appropriations passed by Congress between 2005 and 2008. Some portion of the properties with remaining damage likely also reflect abandonment by owners who moved elsewhere in the wake of the hurricanes. For such properties, funding for demolition, rehabilitation, and land banking may be necessary to transition the properties to a new use, and potentially to support efforts to encourage residents to rebuild in areas with lower flood risks.

Notes: Sample is representative of properties in Louisiana and Mississippi that experienced major or severe hurricane damage and that were located on significantly-affected blocks. Rebuilt structures are residential structures that do not show substantial repair needs as defined in Turnham (2010). Cleared lots contain an empty lot or a foundation with no standing structure. Damaged structures are residential structures that show substantial repair needs—and include all uninhabitable structures. Uninhabitable structures are residential structures that do not meet the Census definition of habitability. 

Source: Spader (2015).

2. Rental properties were rebuilt more slowly than homeowner properties.

A second lesson from the rebuilding process following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is that rental properties were rebuilt more slowly than owner-occupied homes. This likely was due to several factors. While homeowners directly control the rebuilding progress of their home, renters are dependent on landlords’ rebuilding decisions. Smaller “mom-and-pop” landlords may also be slower to rebuild investment properties if their own home is also damaged. And policymakers have been wary of providing rebuilding assistance to rental property owners who did not purchase sufficient insurance.

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, both Louisiana and Mississippi used the CDBG special appropriations for disaster recovery to create rebuilding assistance programs for homeowners and small rental property owners. (Texas, which faced less damage from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, created only a homeowner program.) In both Louisiana and Mississippi, the homeowner programs covered much of the difference between the estimated cost to rebuild and the amount available to the homeowner from insurance and other rebuilding-assistance programs. Conversely, the grant programs for 1-4 unit small rental properties included a more complex set of eligibility requirements that included commitments for the rebuilt units to be rented to qualifying low- and moderate-income tenants. The result was that few rental property owners applied for and received rebuilding assistance, compared to widespread take-up of the homeowner assistance programs. While concerns about the incentive effects associated with bailing out under-insured investors are reasonable, a secondary effect was to reduce the number of rebuilt properties available to renters.

Figure 2 displays the share of hurricane-damaged properties on significantly-affected blocks that received a rebuilding grant through the CDBG-funded homeowner and small rental programs, along with the share of homeowner and small rental properties that were rebuilt by early 2010. The results show that 58 percent of hurricane-damaged homeowner properties in Louisiana and Mississippi received a rebuilding grant, compared to 10 percent of small rental properties. While this rental figure is limited to 1-4 unit small rental properties, a GAO report similarly found that federal assistance through CDBG, the Individual and Households Program, and the Home Disaster Loan Program together reached only 18 percent of all damaged rental units (including units in larger multi-family buildings), compared to 62 percent of damaged homeowner units. The rebuilding outcomes documented in the HUD-commissioned survey also showed sizable gaps, with 74 percent of homeowner properties rebuilt by early 2010 compared to 60 percent of rental properties.

 Source: Spader and Turnham (2014); Spader (2015)

A final question for policymakers is whether to use this opportunity to create a permanent program to support housing recovery following natural disasters. While Congress has relied on the CDBG program for this purpose since the early 1990s, its role is currently defined by the special appropriations legislation drafted following each individual disaster. Making disaster recovery a permanent function of the CDBG program (or creating some other permanent program for housing recovery) would allow HUD to develop permanent regulations and program guidance in anticipation of future disasters. While it is too late for this change to benefit victims of Hurricane Harvey, it might improve preparedness for the next disaster.

Steady Gains in Remodeling Activity Moving into 2018

by Abbe Will
Research Associate

Healthy and stable growth in home improvement and repair spending is anticipated for the remainder of the year and into the first half of 2018, according to our latest Leading Indicator of Remodeling Activity (LIRA), released today. The LIRA projects that annual increases in remodeling expenditures will soften somewhat moving forward, but still remain at or above 6.0 percent through the second quarter of 2018.

The remodeling market continues to benefit from a stronger housing market and, in particular, solid gains in house prices, which are encouraging owners to make larger investments in their homes. Yet, weak gains in home sales activity due to tight inventories in many parts of the country is constraining opportunities for more robust remodeling growth given that significant investments often occur around the time of a sale.

Even with some easing this year, the remodeling market is still expected to grow above its long-term average. Over the coming 12 months, national spending on improvements and repairs to the owner-occupied housing stock is projected to reach fully $324 billion.

For more information about the LIRA, including how it is calculated, visit the JCHS website.

The Effect of Debt on Default and Consumption: Evidence from Housing Policy During the Great Recession

by Peter Ganong and
Pascal Noel, Meyer Fellows

What is the effect of mortgage debt reductions that reduce payments in the long-term but not in the short-term? In a new paper using data from a recent government mortgage modification program, we find that substantial mortgage principal reductions that left short-term payments unchanged had no effect on default or consumption for "underwater" borrowers who owed more on their home than their homes were worth.

This finding is significant because the design of mortgage modification programs was a key question facing policymakers attempting to help struggling households during the Great Recession. Policymakers faced a choice between debt reductions that focused on borrower liquidity by temporarily reducing mortgage payments or debt reductions that focused on borrower solvency by permanently forgiving mortgage debt.

This normative policy debate hinged on fundamental economic questions about the effect of long-term debt obligations on borrowers' default and consumption decisions. While a large academic literature has examined the effect debt reductions that mix both short and long-term payment reductions, little is known about the specific effects of long-term debt obligations.

To help fill this gap, we compared underwater borrowers who received two types of modifications in the federal government's Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Both modification types resulted in identical payment reductions for the first five years. However, one group also received $70,000 in mortgage principal reduction, which translated into increased home equity and substantial long-term payment relief. By comparing borrowers in each of these modification types, we were able to isolate the effects of long-run debt levels holding fixed short-run payments. An important feature of the policy we studied was that borrowers remained underwater even after substantial debt forgiveness.

To compare these borrowers, we built two new datasets with information on borrower outcomes and HAMP participation. Our first dataset matched administrative data on HAMP participants to monthly consumer credit bureau records from Transunion. Our second dataset used de-identified data assembled by the JPMorgan Chase Institute (JPMCI) that included mortgage, credit card, and checking account information for borrowers who received HAMP modification from Chase.

Using an empirical strategy called a regression discontinuity design, we found that principal reduction has no effect on default. The analysis exploited a cutoff rule in a model used by mortgage servicers to assign borrowers between the two modification types. While borrowers just above the cutoff were 41 percentage points more likely to receive principal reduction than those just below the cutoff, default rates were smooth at the cutoff, which indicates that principal reduction had little effect on default (Figures 1 and 2). We also estimated that even at the upper bound of our confidence interval, the government spent $800,000 per avoided foreclosure. This is over an order of magnitude greater than estimates of the social cost of foreclosures.

Figure 1.  

Figure 2.  

In the second part of our empirical analysis, we examined the effect of principal reduction on consumption by comparing the monthly spending of the two groups of borrowers over time. We showed that these two groups of borrowers were similar before modification on a broad range of observable characteristics, and that their credit card and auto spending measures were trending similarly in the months before modification. This means that the payment reduction group could be used as a valid counterfactual control group for the principal reduction group.

We found that $70,000 in principal reduction had no significant impact on underwater borrowers' credit card or auto expenditure (Figure 3). Although the spending of both groups stabilized after modification (consistent with the idea that short-term payment reductions helped borrowers), the group that received the additional principal forgiveness showed no differential effect. Rather, we estimated for each $1 of principal reduction received by borrowers, their total spending increased by only 0.2 cents. This is an order of magnitude smaller than the consumption response for average homeowners examined in prior studies, which typically have found spending increases between 4 and 9 cents per $1 of wealth increase.

Figure 3.

The inability of underwater borrowers to borrow against the housing wealth gains from principal reduction may explain why they were far less sensitive to housing wealth changes than borrowers in other economic conditions. Typically, housing wealth gains expand borrowers' credit access--in fact, prior research has found that equity withdrawal through increased borrowing may account for the entire effect of housing wealth on spending between 2002 and 2006. But if homeowners need positive home equity in order to borrow against their house, then principal reduction that still leaves borrowers underwater or nearly underwater will fail to free up collateral that can be used to finance new consumption. This limitation helps explain why policies to lower current mortgage payments were more effective than principal reductions at increasing consumer spending during the Great Recession.

Making Collaboration Work: Four Lessons from Chicago CDFIs

by Alexander von Hoffman
and Matthew Arck

Although many in the housing and community development field are excited by the idea of collaboration between organizations, such partnerships are often easier said than done. In practice, as our new case study of a partnership in Chicago shows, effective collaboration requires the partners to be thoughtful, nimble, and flexible.

The case study analyzes the work of the Chicago CDFI Collaborative, a partnership of the Community Investment Corporation (CIC), the Chicago Community Loan Fund (CCLF), and Neighborhood Lending Services (NLS). In 2014, the collaborative received a 3-year, $5 million grant from PRO Neighborhoods, a $125 million, 5-year grant program of JPMorgan Chase & Co. that supports community development financial institutions (CDFIs) pursuing innovative collaborations. The Chicago CDFI Collaborative used the money to restore abandoned and dilapidated housing in economically depressed neighborhoods, such as Englewood and West Woodlawn, which were particularly affected by foreclosures in the financial crisis. To do so, it provided loans and technical assistance that helped small-scale investors and owner-occupants purchase and rehabilitate one-to-four-unit buildings, which comprise nearly half of the affordable rental stock in Chicago.

The Chicago CDFI Collaborative helped a small-scale investor acquire and rehabilitate this home in the Chatham neighborhood on Chicago’s South Side. (Photo by Nathan Hardy.)

By 
By early 2017, the collaborative had lent nearly $25 million, acquired or financed the acquisition of 430 properties, and helped to preserve almost 600 housing units in low-income communities.  In interviews, leaders of the Chicago CDFIs identified four important lessons that emerged from their work.

1. Try new approaches

Although each member of the Chicago CDFI Collaborative is a well-established community lender, none of them had focused extensively on abandoned one-to-four-unit buildings. The new partnership enabled the officers of these groups to tackle this vexing problem on a large scale. The lesson, according to Robin Coffey, Chief Credit Officer of NLS, is that instead of “trying to play it safe” by simply expanding the volume of their current lending practices, collaborating CDFIs should imagine “how can we work together to change the way that we’re approaching something” so they can better aid residents of troubled low-income communities.

Some CDFI leaders might be wary of this approach because they perceive other CDFIs as rivals, but participants in the Chicago collaborative said that is not the case. In the CDFI field, Wendell Harris, Director of Lending Operations for CCLF, asserts, “there is so much work that needs to be done, there really is no discussion of us being competitors.”

2. Pursue many lines of attack

CDFIs must develop and carry out a multi-faceted strategy to overcome the multiple and systemic obstacles to revitalization in depressed neighborhoods. One way to do this is by targeting neighborhoods that have other revitalization programs already in place. For example, the Chicago CDFIs prioritized lending in seven neighborhoods where their organizations already were working.  Moreover, since NLS’s parent organization, Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, also dispersed grants from the City of Chicago that help low- and moderate-income homeowners improve the exteriors of their homes, NLS was able to direct some of those outside grants to the same neighborhoods targeted by the Chicago CDFI Collaborative. According to Coffey, this reinforced the coalition’s revitalization efforts. When a potential buyer saw improvements being made to other buildings, the NLS leader explained, he or she would conclude that the neighborhood was “not as bad as I thought.”

In addition, the neighborhoods selected by the Chicago CDFIs were part of a larger set of neighborhoods that received funding from the City of Chicago’s Micro-Market Recovery Program, which supports a variety of revitalization efforts. Adding the PRO Neighborhoods funds to these other tools, such as financial assistance and community organizing, Coffey noted, “made it that much more effective.”

3. Communicate regularly and in-person

Leaders of the collaborating CDFIs stressed that regularly scheduled, in-person meetings were a key to their success. Monthly meetings facilitated open communication, which in turn helped create an effective, adaptive partnership. Doing so in face-to-face meetings rather than conference calls meant that the partners had fewer distractions and were more likely to focus on the work at hand.

The face-to-face meetings also helped partners discover issues sooner than they might have otherwise, and, according to Coffey, gave them a “sense of urgency” to solve the problems that emerged in their discussions. Conferring in person, Harris added, encouraged the partners to share information about their networks of people in the field as well as details about properties that were under discussion. In one meeting, for instance, CIC’s representative told the group that it had acquired a building in a particular neighborhood, and NLS’s representative suggested an owner-occupant who would likely be interested in acquiring and rehabbing it.  

4. Expect the unexpected and adapt to it

Leaders of collaborating CDFIs must be prepared to respond to unexpected conditions on the ground. Going into the venture, the partners in Chicago initially thought the best strategy was to target long-vacant homes for rehabilitation. However, Coffey recalled, “we learned really quickly that getting people into homes so that they wouldn’t become vacant” was easier for the homeowner and better for the block. The partners also discovered that, despite the robust technical assistance provided by the Chicago CDFI Collaborative, many potential owner-occupants remained doubtful they possessed the expertise necessary to rehab long-vacant properties. To adapt, NLS’s leaders broadened their strategy to include run-down buildings that were not currently vacant, but were likely to become vacant if major repairs were not done in the near future.

The members of the Chicago Collaborative also encountered unexpected difficulty when they tried to carry out their core strategy to acquire and renovate large numbers of distressed properties in close proximity. In response, they expanded their efforts beyond simply acquiring foreclosed buildings to include buying tax liens on properties and purchasing and reconverting condominiums back into single properties. Without such changes, said Andre Collins, vice-president of acquisition and disposition strategy for CIC, the Collaborative would have rehabilitated fewer properties and preserved fewer affordable units than they did.

Taken together, these practices can help collaborative efforts succeed, which, Harris says, is particularly important because “it takes a collaborative effort to make things better.”

Growing Demand and Tight Supply are Lifting Home Prices and Rents, Fueling Concerns about Housing Affordability

A decade after the onset of the Great Recession, the national housing market has, by many measures, returned to normal, according to the 2017 State of the Nation’s Housing report, being released today by live webcast from the National League of Cities. Housing demand, home prices, and construction volumes are all on the rise, and the number of distressed homeowners has fallen sharply. However, along with strengthening demand, extremely tight supplies of both for-sale and for-rent homes are pushing up housing costs and adding to ongoing concerns about affordability (map + data tables). At last count in 2015, the report notes, nearly 19 million US households paid more than half of their incomes for housing (map + data tables).

National home prices hit an important milestone in 2016, finally surpassing the pre-recession peak. Drawing on newly available metro-level data, the Harvard researchers found that nominal prices in real prices were up last year in 97 of the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas. At the same time, though, the longer-term gains varied widely across the country, with some markets experiencing home price appreciation of more than 50 percent since 2000, while others posted only modest gains or even declines. These differences have added to the already substantial gap between home prices in the nation’s most and least expensive housing markets (map).

“While the recovery in home prices reflects a welcome pickup in demand, it is also being driven by very tight supply,” says Chris Herbert, the Center’s managing director. Even after seven straight years of  construction growth, the US added less new housing over the last decade than in any other ten-year period going back to at least the 1970s. The rebound in single-family construction has been particularly weak. According to Herbert, “Any excess housing that may have been built during the boom years has been absorbed, and a stronger supply response is going to be needed to keep pace with demand—particularly for moderately priced homes.”

Meanwhile, the national homeownership rate appears to be leveling off. Last year’s growth in homeowners was the largest increase since 2006, and early indications are that homebuying activity continued to gain traction in 2017. “Although the homeownership rate did edge down again in 2016, the decline was the smallest in years. We may be finding the bottom,” says Daniel McCue, a senior research associate at the Center.

Affordability is, of course, key. The report finds that, on average, 45 percent of renters in the nation’s metro areas could afford the monthly payments on a median-priced home in their market area. But in several high-cost metros of the Pacific Coast, Florida, and the Northeast, that share is under 25 percent. Among other factors, the future of US homeownership depends on broadening the access to mortgage financing, which remains restricted primarily to those with pristine credit.

Despite a strong rebound in multifamily construction in recent years, the rental vacancy rate hit a 30-year low in 2016. As a result, rent increases continued to outpace inflation in most markets last year. Although rent growth did slow in a few large metros—notably San Francisco and New York—there is little evidence that additions to rental supply are outstripping demand. In contrast, with most new construction at the high end and ongoing losses at the low end (interactive chart), there is a growing mismatch between the rental stock and growing demand from low- and moderate-income households.

Income growth did, however, pick up last year, reducing the number of US households paying more than 30 percent of income for housing—the standard measure of affordability—for the fifth straight year. But coming on the heels of substantial increases during the housing boom and bust, the number of households with housing cost burdens remains much higher today than at the start of last decade. Moreover, almost all of the improvement has been on the owner side. “The problem is most acute for renters. More than 11 million renter households paid more than half their incomes for housing in 2015, leaving little room to pay for life’s other necessities,” says Herbert.

Looking at the decade ahead, the report notes that as the members of the millennial generation move into their late 20s and early 30s, the demand for both rental housing and entry-level homeownership is set to soar. The most racially and ethnically diverse generation in the nation’s history, these young households will propel demand for a broad range of housing in cities, suburbs, and beyond. The baby-boom generation will also continue to play a strong role in housing markets, driving up investment in both existing and new homes to meet their changing needs as they age. “Meeting this growing and diverse demand will require concerted efforts by the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to expand the range of housing options available,” says McCue.

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Live Webcast Today @ Noon ET

Tune into today's live webcast from the National League of Cities in Washington, DC, featuring:

Kriston Capps, Staff Writer, CityLab (panel moderator)
Chris Herbert, Managing Director, Joint Center for Housing Studies
Robert C. Kettler, Chairman & CEO, Kettler
Terri Ludwig, President & CEO, Enterprise Community Partners
Mayor Catherine E. Pugh, City of Baltimore, Maryland

Tweet questions & join the conversation on Twitter with #harvardhousingreport

What Can We Learn from Attempts to Reduce the Cost of Affordable Housing?

by Sam LaTronica
Gramlich Fellow

Midwestern CDCs trying to build affordable homes that do not require development subsidies have identified three potentially promising strategies: building smaller homes, utilizing factory-built homes, and creatively designing houses to get more out of them. In a new working paper that grows out my work as an Edward M. Gramlich Fellow in Community and Economic Development I conclude that while each technique presents opportunities for cost savings, each also comes with its own set of challenges.

The fellowship, which is co-sponsored by the Joint Center for Housing Studies and NeighborWorks^® America, also expanded my horizons because for years, my conception of new “affordable housing” had been limited to the standard multifamily properties developed in larger urban areas. This was the type of affordable housing I had seen since moving to the Boston area, as well as working for an affordable advocacy organization in the San Francisco Bay Area prior to attending the Harvard Graduate School of Design.

As a Gramlich Fellow in the summer of 2015, I was exposed to a new region and new approach to affordable housing. The Midwestern CDCs, which were part of NeighborWorks^® America’s national network, often had in-house general contractors and focused on building and selling affordable single-family homes, in both urban and rural areas. Given the dearth of housing subsidies, particularly subsidies for affordable housing in rural areas, these CDCs were trying to find cost-saving construction techniques that would allow them to build affordable housing without development subsidies.

The Rambler, a single-family home constructed by the Southwest Minnesota Housing Partnership. The home is 1,092 square feet on the main floor with another 1,092 square feet of unfinished basement space that can be converted into living space or more bedrooms at a later date. This home was constructed in 2014 with an asking price of $153,900.

Through reading popular literature on home construction, analyzing building trends, conducting interviews with CDC leaders, and visiting new developments in the Midwest, it became clear that CDCs were interested in pursuing three potential cost saving techniques: building smaller homes, using factory-built homes, and creatively designing houses to get more out of them.

Smaller homes are theoretically cheaper to build because they simply require fewer materials and less construction time. Once occupied, these houses not only can be cheaper to heat or cool but also will cost less to maintain. Smaller footprints also make it possible to build these homes on smaller or irregularly shaped lots, which helps expand the options for CDCs.

However, cost savings are not always realized when buildings are smaller. Once land and other development costs are factored in, it is possible that building smaller homes will be only slightly cheaper than building larger homes on the same lot. Moreover, the marginal cost of constructing a few hundred more square feet might allow the CDC to sell the house for more money while still keeping it affordable. Some CDC leaders also worry that producing affordable homes that are much smaller than new market-rate homes would create obvious distinctions between income levels and stigmatize the people living in the new, smaller homes. Finally, while building smaller can be smart for a number of reasons, most people still want bigger homes as evidenced by the fact that average house sizes have been increasing and have recently surpassed pre-recession levels. This suggests that without a shift in the overall market, smaller homes may not be a particularly appealing option for CDCs trying to build affordable housing.

While factory-built construction techniques are not necessarily new, they are new to many CDCs. Many Midwestern CDCs are currently experimenting with (or exploring the possibility of using) both modular homes and homes made from structural insulated panels (SIPs). Factory-built homes have the benefit of being produced mostly indoors and using assembly line techniques, which can significantly reduce onsite construction time and protect against weather delays, theft, vandalism, etc. Moreover, homes built in factory-controlled settings can be tighter and more energy efficient and make more efficient usage of building materials (which should reduce their cost).

Like building smaller, however, the cost savings that are touted in popular literature are harder to realize in practice. If CDCs, architects, contractors, and subcontractors do not have enough experience working with factory-built housing, then the development process can hit major roadblocks that negate the hypothetical cost savings that would result from a shorter construction period and lower production costs. In fact, some CDCs that experimented with these techniques ended up with homes that cost far more than they would have cost using traditional stick-built techniques.

Finally, creatively designing houses can supplement the previous construction types to get the most out of new homes. This can come in many forms. Designing attached accessory dwelling units will add more units to the housing stock and can supplement the primary tenant’s income.  Co-housing development can utilize scale and reduce the per-owner development costs. Open floor plans can make smaller homes more palatable and unfinished buildouts can reduce costs while allowing families to later customize their home to meet their particular needs.

In the end, there is no silver bullet that can be used to build affordable single-family homes without a development subsidy. However, there are many techniques that, when combined, could produce significant cost savings. CDC leaders interested in pursuing these approaches should remember that the benefits of these techniques, as described in popular literature, do not always materialize in practice. Therefore, CDC leaders should learn from others who have already experimented with them. They should also establish strong relationships with architects and contractors who have experience with these techniques, so that they reduce the likelihood of delays that would drive up costs. Hopefully, by persevering and learning from others, the CDCs can increase the production of affordable homes.

Sam LaTronica, who graduated from the Harvard Graduate School of Design in 2016, was a 2015 recipient of the TheEdward M. Gramlich Fellowship in Community and Economic Development, which is co-sponsored by NeighborWorks®America and the Joint Center for Housing Studies.

Defining the Generations Redux

by George Masnick
Senior Research Fellow

How should we define the baby boom, Generation X, and the millennial generation?

In a Joint Center blog published in 2012, I argued that using 20-year age spans for each generation would make it easier to compare them. Since many researchers still use generational definitions that span different and inconsistent age ranges, particularly for millennials, it is perhaps timely to reframe and restate my case.

In keeping with my recommendations, the Joint Center has long identified the cohort born between 1945 and 1964 as baby boomers.Those born between 1965 and 1984 are Generation X, and the cohort born between 1985 and 2004 are millennials (Figure 1). 

However, other analysts use several different earlier dates to usher in the millennial generation, apparently because they want to ensure that the oldest member of this cohort were considered adults at the dawn of the new millennium (i.e. they had turned 18 or 20 in the year 2000). This definition meant that by 2015, the oldest millennials were in their mid-30s, old enough to prompt compelling stories about how many 30-somethings were still living with parents, living in cities, forsaking marriage and childbearing, and delaying homeownership. In contrast, under my recommended cut-off dates, the oldest millennials turned age 20 in 2005 and didn’t start entering their 30s until 2015.

Besides making it easier to compare generations, there are several reasons why the millennial generation should start with those born in 1985 and turning 20 in 2005. As I noted in my 2012 blog, 1985 was the year that U.S. births once again exceeded 3.7 million, the approximate number that demarcated the beginning and the end of the baby boom, as well as the beginning and the end of the “baby bust” that defines Generation X.

Three other big changes occurred shortly after 2005 that significantly altered the way young adults live. First, social media participation skyrocketed. Facebook became available to everyone age 13 and older with a valid e-mail address in September 2006. Twitter became public in 2006. The first iPhone was released in June of 2007. As a result of these and other changes, the share of adults using social media rose from five percent in 2005 to 69 percent in 2016, according to a recent Pew Research publication.

Second, student loan debt outstanding more than tripled between 2005 and 2016, rising from $400 billion to over $1.3 trillion. This high level of debt is thought to affect everything from leaving the parental home, to getting married and starting a family, and purchasing a first home. 

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the economic changes that led to the Great Recession hit hardest among young adults who were in their 20s shortly after 2005. The unemployment rate of adults older than 25 without a high school degree rose from below six percent in late 2006 to 15 percent in mid-2009. (Those with a high school degree or more followed this trend within a year.) Unemployment rates of those with a high school degree or more have slowly improved, but still remain above pre-recession levels. Unemployment rates for those with less than a high school degree have returned to their pre-recession elevated levels, but people in this group generally are making less money and receiving fewer benefits than they did before the recession. Meanwhile, housing costs have returned to, or now exceed, their pre-recession levels.

Using equally broad 20-year age spans produces several important findings about the different generations. To start with, the millennial generation has been larger than the baby boom generation, now or at any other previous time since the boomers were age 10-29 in 1975 (Figure 2). Millennials now number almost 87 million compared to less than 79 million for baby boomers at the same age. This is in contrast to findings of a 2016 Pew Research study that compared generations using millennials with a smaller age range and found roughly equal numbers between these two generations in 2015 (75 million).

Source: Census Bureau Population Estimates 1975-2015

Using consistent age spans also shows the changing ways that immigration has affected the number of people in each generation. In 1995, when Generation X was age 10-29, it was smaller than the baby boom generation was in 1955, when it was the same age. However, because of immigration, by 2005, when Generation X was age 20-39, it already exceeded the number of baby boomers at the same age. 

Immigrants also make up a small but growing share of millennials. In 2015, 9.6 percent of millennials were foreign born compared to 21.4 percent of Generation X, and 15.3 percent of baby boomers (Figure 3). However, according to the latest Census Bureau population projections, the share of millennials who are foreign born is expected to rise to 20.9 percent in 2035 when they are age 30-49, which will boost the number of millennials to 97.3 million (Figure 4).  

Source: Census Bureau Population Projections for 2015

* Data do not allow 85-89 year olds from 85+ age group

Source: Census Bureau Population Projections for 2035

Finally, the constant-age-span approach allows us to identify significant generational differences in race and ethnicity. Overall, in 2015, 45.4 percent of millennials, 41 percent of Generation X, and 28.6 percent of baby boomers were minorities (i.e. non-Hispanic Blacks, non-Hispanic Asian/Others, or Hispanics of any race). Moreover, because of continued immigration, the share of millennials who are minorities is projected to rise to almost 50 percent in 2035 and the share of Generation X is projected to rise slightly to 42.4 percent. In contrast, the share of baby boomers who are minorities is projected to hold constant at 28.6 percent. 

These differences reflect changes for both foreign-born and native-born members of each generation. In 2015, fully 85 percent of both foreign-born millennials and foreign-born members of Generation X were minorities.  In contrast, only 78.5 percent of foreign-born baby boomers were minorities. Moreover, while 41.2 percent of native-born millennials were minorities, only 29 percent of native-born members of Generation X and 19.6 percent of native-born baby boomers were minorities (Figure 5).

* Data do not allow 85-89 year olds from 85+ age group

Source: Census Bureau Population Projections

Looking forward to 2035, the size of the baby boom cohort will drop to about 60 million people because a growing number of baby boomers will pass away. Many millennials and members of Generation X will want to live in the housing units formerly occupied by those baby boomers. Their ability to do so will not only be shaped by the fundamental economic and social changes discussed above but also by whether the large numbers of racial and ethnic minorities in these two generations will have full access to those housing markets, and with it, the ability to achieve the American dream.